Recent Proposals to
Limit Medigap Coverage and
Modify Medicare Cost Sharing
KATHRYN LINEHAN, Principal Policy Analyst
OVERVIEW — As policymakers look for savings from the Medicare

program, some have proposed eliminating or discouraging “firstdollar coverage” available through privately purchased Medigap policies.
Medigap coverage, which beneficiaries obtain to protect themselves from
Medicare’s cost-sharing requirements and its lack of a cap on out-ofpocket spending, may discourage the judicious use of medical services
by reducing or eliminating beneficiary cost sharing. It is estimated that
eliminating such coverage, which has been shown to be associated with
higher Medicare spending, and requiring some cost sharing would
encourage beneficiaries to reduce their service use and thus reduce program spending. However, eliminating first-dollar coverage could cause
some beneficiaries to incur higher spending or forego necessary services.
Some policy proposals to eliminate first-dollar coverage would also
modify Medicare’s cost sharing and add an out-of-pocket spending cap
for fee-for-service Medicare. This paper discusses Medicare’s current
cost-sharing requirements, Medigap insurance, and proposals to modify
Medicare’s cost sharing and eliminate first-dollar coverage in Medigap
plans. It reviews the evidence on the effects of first-dollar coverage on
spending, some objections to eliminating first-dollar coverage, and
results of research that has modeled the impact of eliminating first-dollar
coverage, modifying Medicare’s cost-sharing requirements, and adding
an out-of-pocket limit on beneficiaries’ spending.
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eneficiaries in fee-for-service Medicare are liable for
cost sharing for services covered under Parts A and B
(Table 1, next page).1 The amount of the cost sharing varies
by service and, in some cases, by the number of days the service is used. Medicare Part A has a relatively high deductible
($1,156 in 2012) for inpatient stays for each spell of illness and
varying daily copayments for extended hospital stays. Part
B has a relatively low annual deductible ($140 in 2012), but
has 20 percent copayment on physician visits and most other
Part B services.
There is no upper limit on beneficiaries’ out-of-pocket spending in
fee-for-service Medicare, which leaves beneficiaries at risk for significant expenditures if they use a lot of health care services or very
expensive services. In any given year, cost-sharing liability varies
across beneficiaries. In 2009, 43 percent of benefiFIGURE 1
ciaries had cost-sharing liability of less than $500,
Cost-Sharing Liability for
while 6 percent had more than $5,000 in cost-sharMedicare Fee-for-Service Beneficiaries, 2009
ing liability. See Figure 1 for the distribution of
fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiaries’ Medicare cost$10,000 or more: 2%
$5,000 to $9,999: 4% sharing liabilities in 2009.
$2,000 to $4,999: 16% To protect against some or all of their liability for
$0 to $499

$1,000 to
$1,999

43%

$500
to $999

16%

19%

Note: The amounts reflect Medicare beneficiaries’ liability but do not reflect what Medicare beneficiaries
actually paid out of pocket because most beneficiaries
have supplemental coverage that covers all or some
of their Medicare cost sharing.
Source: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission,
"Reforming Medicare’s Benefit Design," presentation to the Commission, October 7, 2011, p. 8,
available at www.medpac.gov/transcripts/benefit%20
design.pdf.
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cost sharing and the absence of a cap on out-ofpocket expenditures, over 90 percent of beneficiaries had some kind of supplemental coverage in
2010.2 About one-third of beneficiaries had supplemental coverage through an employer-sponsored
retiree plan, which may cover all or some of Medicare’s cost sharing, but is an option only for those
whose employers offer such coverage.3 Over onequarter of beneficiaries are enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans,
which have an annual mandatory maximum out-of-pocket limit on
total enrollee cost-sharing liability for Parts A and B services, and
may have lower cost sharing and offer more benefits than traditional
FFS Medicare. Another one-fifth of Medicare beneficiaries are dually
eligible for Medicaid, which covers some or all of their cost sharing.
One in five Medicare beneficiaries had a Medigap policy in 2010.4
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TABLE 1
Medicare Cost Sharing, 2012
SERVICES

BENEFICIARY LIABILITY

Part A
Hospital Inpatient Stay

• $1,156 deductible per benefit period
• $0 for the first 60 days of each benefit period
• $289 per day for days 61–90 of each benefit period
• $578 per "lifetime reserve day" after day 90 of each benefit period (up to a
maximum of 60 days over a lifetime)
• All charges for each day after the exhaustion of covered benefit period and
lifetime reserve days

Skilled Nursing Facility

• $0 for the first 20 days per benefit period
• $144.50 per day for days 21–100 of each benefit period
• All charges for each day after day 100 in a benefit period

Home Health Care

• $0 for Medicare-approved services

Hospice Care

• $0 for hospice care
• A copayment of up to $5 per prescription for outpatient prescription drugs
for pain and symptom management
• 5 percent of the Medicare-approved amount for inpatient respite care (shortterm care given by another caregiver, so the usual caregiver can rest)

Blood

If the hospital has to buy blood, beneficiaries must either pay the hospital costs
for the first three units of blood in a calendar year or have the blood donated.

Part B
Part B Deductible

$140 per year

Medical and Other Services
(including physician services)

20 percent of the Medicare-approved amount for most doctor services,
outpatient therapy, durable medical equipment, and drugs covered under Part B

Outpatient Hospital Services

Coinsurance (for doctor services) or a copayment amount for most outpatient
hospital services that varies by service (amounts are being phased down over
time to 20 percent of Medicare allowed amount). The copayment for a single
service cannot be more than the amount of the inpatient hospital deductible.

Mental Health Services

40 percent of the Medicare-approved amount for most outpatient mental health
care

Home Health Services

$0 for Medicare-approved services

Clinical Laboratory Services

$0 for Medicare-approved services

Blood

Beneficiaries pay a copayment for the blood processing and handling services
for every unit of blood and the Part B deductible applies.
If the provider has to buy blood, the beneficiary must either pay the provider
costs for the first 3 units of blood in a calendar year or have the blood donated.
Beneficiaries pay a copayment for additional units of blood received as an
outpatient (after the first 3), and the Part B deductible applies.

Source: Medicare.gov, "2012 Medicare Costs," U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, available at www.medicare.gov/cost/.
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Beneficiaries may have more than one type of supplemental coverage; for example, dual eligibles may be enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans or have a Medigap policy, and these counts reflect those
overlapping sources of coverage.5

M EDI G A P I N SU R A N C E
Medigap is a private individual or group health insurance product
designed to pay for costs that Medicare does not cover. Medigap
policies were standardized as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. The law mandated that all companies selling
Medigap plans must offer the standard set of benefits to facilitate
consumers’ comparisons across products. The National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) developed ten standardized
policies, designated by letters A through J, that were the only plans
that could be sold after July 31, 1992 (although policies already in effect could be renewed).6 Individual states were permitted to restrict
the number of standardized plans sold to fewer than ten. In addition, a grandfathering provision allowed states that had previously
standardized their state’s plan offerings to apply for an exemption
from the federal rules. Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Wisconsin
were eligible for this exemption and continue to permit different
standardized policies to be sold in their states.7
Over time, standardized plans have been tweaked or eliminated and
new plans have been added. The currently offered Medigap plans
are designated by the letters A through N. Plans E, H, I, and J are no
longer sold, except to those who had them before they were eliminated and elect to keep them. Not all letter-designated plans are available in all states. Insurers that sell Medigap plans in a state must sell
plan A and must also offer plan C or F if they offer additional plans.
M e dig a p B e n e f i t s

All of the standardized plan types cover the Part A hospital coinsurance, 365 additional hospital days, and all or some of Part B coinsurance. (See Table 2, next page, for a list of standard policies and their
benefits.) All but plan A cover some or all of the hospital deductible. Plan F, which offers the most comprehensive coverage of all the
plans, is the most popular by far, with 44 percent of policyholders
choosing it in 2010. Plan C, which offers identical benefits to plan
4
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TABLE 2
Available Medigap Plan Benefits
BENEFITS

A

B

C

D

Part A Hospital Coinsurance
and Hospital Costs
(up to an additional 365 days
after Medicare benefits are used)

·
·
·
·

·
·
·
·
·

·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·

·
·
·
·
·
·

Medicare Part B Coinsurance
or Copayment
Blood (first 3 pints)
Part A Hospice Care
Coinsurance or Copayment
Skilled Nursing Facility Care
Coinsurance
Medicare Part A Deductible
Medicare Part B Deductible
Medicare Part B
Excess Charges
Foreign Travel Emergency
(up to plan limits)

·

F*

·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
· ·

G

K

L

M

N

· · · · ·
·
· ·
·
· ·
·
· ·
·
· ·
·
·
·
·
· ·
50%

75%

50%

75%

50%

75%

50%

75%

50%

75%

**

50%

Out-of-Pocket
Limit

$4,640

$2,320

Indicates coverage of described benefit at 100 percent.

* Plan F also offers a high-deductible plan. If a beneficiary chooses this option, she must pay for Medicare-covered costs (coinsurance, copayments, deductibles) up to the deductible amount of $2,000 in 2011 before the Medigap policy pays anything.

** Plan N pays 100 percent of the Part B coinsurance, except for a copayment of up to $20 for some office visits and up to a $50 copayment for emergency
room visits that do not result in an inpatient admission.
Source: Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare & You 2012, p. 67, available at www.medicare.gov/publications/pubs/pdf/10050.pdf.

F except for coverage for Part B excess charges,8 is the second most
popular plan with 15 percent of policyholders in 2010.9 Plans K and
L, which cover some but not all of Medicare’s cost-sharing requirements and have out-of-pocket limits on beneficiary spending, are
newer products that were established in the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Modernization, and Improvement Act of 2003. Premiums for
these two plans are generally lower than other plans but, as of 2008,
they had not proven to be very popular options, chosen by less than
0.5 percent of Medigap policyholders.10 Plans M and N are even newer—first offered in June 2010—and they too cover some but not all of
5
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Medicare’s cost sharing. Plan N is novel in that it will cover Medicare’s Part B coinsurance, except for a beneficiary copayment of up to
$20 for office visits and $50 for emergency department visits.
G u a ra n te e d I s s u e a n d M e di c al L o s s Ra tio Re q uire m e n t s

All Medicare beneficiaries are eligible to purchase a Medigap policy
when they turn 65.11 Specifically, for six months after the first day of
the month in which they are 65 and enrolled in Medicare Parts A
and B, Medicare beneficiaries have an open enrollment period during which they are guaranteed to be issued a Medigap policy, provided they can pay the premiums. During this open enrollment period, insurance companies cannot apply medical underwriting (that
is, charge more for a policy based on health status or pre-existing
conditions), refuse to sell a Medigap policy, or make a beneficiary
wait for coverage to start.12 Beneficiaries may still be able to buy Medigap after the open enrollment period, but an insurance company
does not have to sell the policy if an applicant does not meet medical
underwriting requirements.13
In addition to requirements for standardized benefits and guaranteed issue, Medigap plans are required to meet medical loss ratio
requirements. By federal law, Medigap plans must spend at least 65
cents of every premium dollar that enrollees pay on medical care
(this is known as the medical loss ratio), as opposed to administrative costs, for policies sold in the individual market, and 75 cents of
every premium dollar for policies sold in the group market. If plans
do not meet this requirement, policyholders must be paid a refund
so that the required loss ratio is met. These medical loss ratio requirements are lower than those imposed by the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) on individual and small group
plans; legislation was introduced in the 112th Congress to require
higher medical loss ratios for Medigap plans.14 According to the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE), the average enrollment-weighted medical loss ratio for individual policies was 80 percent for the period between 2001 and 2010. For that same period, the
average for group policies was 83 percent.15
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M e dig a p M a r ke t

The market for Medigap plans is concentrated. (See Figure 2 for national
Medigap market shares.) Two companies, active in nearly all insurance
markets, have 40 percent of the national market.16 UnitedHealth Group
has the largest national market share with about
FIGURE 2
31 percent. UnitedHealth Group’s purchase of the
Medigap Market Share by Company, 2010
AARP brand allows it to use that brand to market
and sell using a recognized name.17 The Mutual of
Omaha Group has nearly 11 percent of the market.
Five other firms each had between 2 and 6 percent
of the market. Many other firms share the remainUnitedHealth
ing 39 percent of the market, but none had a market
Group
Other
31.0%
share greater than 1.8 percent. According to ASPE
39.2%
research, “the top 2 insurers account for more than
half of the Medigap market in 45 states and more
than 80 percent of the market in 12 states” in 2010.18
Mutual of Omaha
Group: 10.7%
WellPoint Inc.
Group: 6.1%
M e dig a p P re miu m s
Health Care Services Group: 5.0%
Beneficiaries pay a monthly premium, set by the
CNO Financial Group: 3.6%
insurance companies selling the plans, to maintain
BCBS of Michigan: 2.3%
their Medigap policies. Medigap plans are priced
Highmark Group: 2.0%
one of three ways, depending on the insurers’ poliNote: Organizations are identified by insurer group
cies and the laws of the state in which the plans are sold. The difcodes in the NAIC Medicare Supplemental Insurference among the three pricing methods for Medigap plans is the
ance Experience Exhibit data. Market share is based
on the number of covered lives.
extent to which premiums vary with the age of the policyholder.
Premiums for “community rated” policies are the same for everyone
Source: Steven Sheingold, Adele Shartzer, and Dan
regardless of age. Premiums for “issue-age rated” policies are based
Ly, “Variation and Trends in Medigap Premiums,”
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
on the age of the policyholder at the time the policy is purchased;
Assistant Secretary of Planning and Evaluation,
people who initially purchase the policy when they are younger will
Office of Health Policy, December 2011, p. 18,
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2011/
have lower premiums over the life of the policy than those who iniMedigapPremiums/index.pdf.
tially purchase the policy at an older age. Premiums for “attainedage rated” policies are based on the current age of the policyholder,
so the cost goes up as the policyholder ages.
In 2010, the average national premium for the most popular plan
F was about $172 per month (Figure 3, next page). Premiums vary
across states; for example, the average monthly premium for plan F
ranged from a low of $79 per month in Vermont to $220 per month
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in New York.19 Plans K and L, which do not provide first-dollar coverage for all services, but do pay a share of the cost sharing and
provide coverage after beneficiaries reach out-of-pocket spending
limits (Table 2), have lower national average monthly premiums
than the vastly more popular and comprehensive plans C and F.20
Plans M and N, the two newest standardized policies which also
cover some but not all of Medicare’s cost sharing, have the lowest
premiums, on average.

FIGURE 3
Monthly Medigap Premiums, National Averages with
High and Low Premiums by State, 2010
$300

$286
$269
$248

$250

$246
$220
$194

$200

$173
$150

$222

$178

$172

$165

$147

$143

$137

$122

$117
$97
$82

$100

$79

$77
$61

$73

$71

$50

$42

A

B

C

D

F

G

K

L

$58
$53
$49

M

$44
$28
$16
N

Medigap Plan
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation Program on Medicare Policy, “Medigap Reform: Setting the Context,” September 2011, p. 4, available
at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/8235-2.pdf.
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A recent study by ASPE examined factors that are associated with
the variations in the Medigap premiums at the state level.21 It found
that:
• Higher per capita Medicare spending was associated with higher
Medigap premiums: a 10 percent increase in Medicare spending per
person was associated with a 6 percent higher Medigap premium.
• Market concentration was associated with premiums for plan C
but not all plans’ premiums: Plan C premiums were higher in markets with higher Medigap market concentration, but market concentration was not a significant predictor of premiums in general.
• State rating rules were associated with premiums: premiums in
states where most policies are issue-age rated were about 7 percent
lower than premiums in states where most plans were attained-age
rated.
• Older policies were more expensive than newer policies.
• Individual policies were more expensive than group policies.
• Policies with a fewer number of covered lives were more expensive than those with more covered lives.

L I M I T I N G FI R S T- DO L L A R COV ER AG E A N D
M O DI F Y I N G M EDI C A RE’ S COS T SH A RI N G
Section 3210 of PPACA contained a provision for the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to request the NAIC to review and revise the benefit packages of plans C and F, the most popular Medigap plans.22 The law states that the packages are to be updated
to include requirements for nominal cost sharing to encourage the
use of appropriate physicians’ services under Part B, and that the
NAIC, in its considerations, is to look at evidence published in peerreviewed journals or current examples used by integrated delivery
systems. To the extent practicable, the revised benefit packages are to
be implemented as of January 1, 2015. As of January 2012, the NAIC
Medigap PPACA Subgroup of the Senior Issues Task Force,23 consisting of state regulators, consumer advocates, and insurance industry
representatives, has not yet made its final recommendation on adding nominal cost sharing, but it has drafted modified Medigap regulations that add nominal cost sharing to plans C and F of the lesser
of $20 or the Medicare Part B coinsurance or co-payment for each
covered health care provider office visit. The draft language would
9
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also add nominal cost sharing (of an unspecified amount) for specific Part B services that have yet to be decided.24 The NAIC’s work
toward making recommendations is ongoing.
Additional proposals to limit first-dollar coverage and modify Medicare’s cost sharing have been discussed recently as policymakers
look for ways to reduce Medicare spending and rationalize cost sharing and benefit design. (Proposals are shown in Table 3, next page.)
Cost savings from such policies are estimated based on evidence
that first-dollar coverage is related to higher Medicare spending.
However, modifying cost sharing and limiting first-dollar Medigap
coverage can be controversial because these policies shift costs to
beneficiaries and other payers and affect beneficiaries differently depending on their coverage and health status, service use, and income
levels. As discussed below, some also contend that such policies are
too blunt because beneficiaries may choose to forego necessary services as well as those of questionable value when they face a greater
share of the cost of services.
Relationship Bet ween Fir s t- Dollar Coverage and Spending

Evidence has shown that Medicare beneficiaries with Medigap use
more Medicare-covered services and have higher Medicare costs
than beneficiaries without supplemental coverage.25 For example, a
study for the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC)
in 2009 using data from 2003 to 2005 found that “secondary insurance has a substantial impact on Medicare spending, consistent
with the prior literature in this area….[I]ndividuals with Medigap
coverage had Medicare costs 33 percent higher than those with no
secondary insurance. Other private secondary insurance was associated with smaller increases in spending.”26 This same study also
found that first-dollar coverage, regardless of the type of supplemental insurance, was associated with higher spending, and that types
of services most affected by the presence of private supplemental
insurance included elective admissions, preventive services, minor
procedures, and endoscopies. The conclusion usually drawn from
this and similar studies, reflected in the savings estimates of current
proposals to limit first-dollar coverage, is that limiting such coverage
will result in use of fewer services by beneficiaries and, thus, lower
Medicare spending.
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20%

N/A

20%

N/A

$550

N/A

$550

N/A

Congressional Budget
Office
(Option 1: Modify cost
sharing)

Congressional Budget
Office
(Option 2: Limit Medigap
coverage)

Congressional Budget
Office
(Option 3: Modify
cost sharing and limit
Medigap coverage)

The President’s Plan
for Economic Growth
and Deficit Reduction

N/A

$5,500

N/A

$5,500

$7,500

MEDICARE
ANNUAL OUTOF-POCKET CAP

N/A

Limit coverage to 50
percent of the next
$4,950 in Medicare cost
sharing

Cannot cover first $550
in cost sharing (new
deductible)

Limit coverage to 50
percent of the next
$4,950 in Medicare cost
sharing

Cannot cover first $550
in cost sharing

N/A

Limit coverage to 50
percent of the next
$5,000 in Medicare cost
sharing

Cannot cover first $500
in cost sharing

MEDIGAP
LIMITS

30% Part B premium
surcharge on new
enrollees who purchase
first dollar Medigap
policies, starting in 2017

N/A

N/A

N/A

Similar provisions
apply to TRICARE for
Life, federal retirees,
and private employer
covered retirees

OTHER

$2.5 billion
from 2017-2021

$93 billion
from 2012-2021

$53 billion
from 2012-2021

$32 billion
from 2012-2021

$148 billion
from 2012-2020

ESTIMATED
SAVINGS

Source: National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, "The Moment of Truth," December 2010, pp. 37–38, available at www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/
TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf; Congressional Budget Office, "Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options," March 2011, pp. 49–50, available at www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
ftpdocs/120xx/doc12085/03-10-reducingthedeficit.pdf; Office of Management and Budget, "Living Within Our Means: The President’s Plan for Economic Growth and Deficit Reduction," September
2011, p. 39, available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2012/assets/jointcommitteereport.pdf.

Notes: Estimated savings from National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform are $110B from expanding Medicare cost-sharing, restricting Medigap Coverage, and creating a catastrophic
cap and an additional $38 billion from reforming TRICARE for life to align with Medigap rules.

5% between
$5,500 and $7,500

20% up to $5,500

$550

National
Commission on Fiscal
Responsibility and
Reform
(a.k.a. Simpson-Bowles)

PROPOSAL

UNIFORM
COINSURANCE
RATE

COMBINED
ANNUAL
DEDUCTIBLE

TABLE 3: Recent Proposals for Modifying Medicare Part A and B Cost Sharing and
Restricting First-Dollar Coverage in Medigap Policies
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The policy implications of studies finding more use among those with
first-dollar coverage may be less clear, as noted in the MedPAC study
and echoed by critics of limiting first-dollar coverage. Many studies
of greater service use among beneficiaries with Medigap coverage
cannot determine whether their greater use is due to having more
coverage or due to a selection effect, whereby those who need more
services are more likely to buy insurance coverage.27 Similarly, studies cannot clearly distinguish between differences in beneficiaries’
use of necessary and unnecessary care, nor can they definitively
measure the effects of the use of additional services on health. This
has led some to conclude that the exacerbation of conditions due to
foregone services may partially offset savings achieved by eliminating first-dollar coverage.28
The NAIC Subgroup working on adding nominal cost sharing to
plans C and F voiced some of these concerns in a discussion paper29
and a letter to the co-chairs of the Joint Select Committee on Deficit
Reduction30 in the fall of 2011. In the discussion paper, the Subgroup
argues that policies to restrict first-dollar coverage are based on a
faulty assumption that beneficiaries drive overutilization. In addition, they say that policies to eliminate first-dollar coverage do not
adequately consider the adverse impact on health that could result
from avoiding necessary services, or the disproportionate effect that
such policies would have on those with low or modest incomes and
those who are very sick. Two recent studies discussed below modeled the effects of such policy changes and their effect on the spending of different groups of beneficiaries.
Elimina tin g Fir s t- D o lla r C ove ra g e a n d M o dif yin g
C o s t S ha rin g : Ef f e c t s o n B e n e f i cia rie s

As shown above in Table 3, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
and others have estimated the effects on federal spending of policy
options to eliminate first-dollar coverage and modify Medicare’s
cost-sharing requirements. Two recent studies from the Kaiser Family Foundation Program on Medicare Policy estimated the potential
effects on beneficiary spending.31
The first of these studies modeled the effects of three different Medigap reform proposals on federal and Medigap enrollees’ spending,
assuming no additional changes to the Medicare benefit design or cost
sharing. The three options modeled are shown in Table 4, next page.
12
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Under the three options modeled, 78 to 83 percent of Medigap enrollees
would see a reduction in net out-of-pocket costs, inclusive of Medigap
premiums, which are estimated to be reduced as a result of declining
Medigap insurer claim costs.32 However, although the effects varied
slightly in each of the three options tested, the analysis found that
about one in five Medigap enrollees would pay more in cost sharing
that would not be offset by premium reductions. The study found that
“reforms would have a disproportionately negative impact on enrollees with modest incomes, in relatively poor health, and those with
any inpatient hospital utilization.”33 The report concludes that restricting first-dollar coverage could yield some savings for the Medicare
programs and for some beneficiaries due to reduced use of services,
but also cautions that “there is no way of ensuring that enrollees who
might reduce their utilization would forego only services of questionable value” and notes that more research is needed on how such policies would affect beneficiaries’ health.34

TABLE 4
Medigap Reform Options Modeled in Analysis

OPTION

AMOUNT
ENROLLEE PAYS

AMOUNT
MEDIGAP PAYS

ESTIMATED
MEDICARE SAVINGS,
FY 2011

1: Based on CBO
and similar to
Simpson Bowles

First $550 of any required
cost sharing for services
covered under Parts A
or B; 50% of additional
required cost sharing up
to $3,025 limit on out‐ofpocket spending

50% of required cost
sharing after the first
$550 paid by enrollee up
to $3,025 out‐of‐pocket
spending limit; 100% of
costs for Part A/B cost
sharing above out‐of‐
pocket limit

$4.6 billion

2: Similar to
Medigap Plan L
(more generous than
option 1)

25% of Part A deductible
($1,132 in 2011); 100% of
Part B deductible ($162
in 2011); 25% of required
cost sharing for Part A/B
services up to $2,070 limit
on out‐of‐pocket spending

75% of Part A deductible;
75% of A/B coinsurance
up to $2,070 out‐of‐pocket
spending limit; 100% of
costs for cost sharing
above out‐of-pocket
spending limit

$2.3 billion

3: Similar to
Medigap Plan N

100% of Part B deductible;
$20 per office visit; $50 per
emergency room visit

100% of Part A deductible
and cost sharing for all
other Medicare‐covered
services

$1.5 billion

Source: Mark Merlis, “Medigap Reforms: Potential Effects of Benefit Restrictions on Medicare Spending and Beneficiary Costs,” for the
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation Program on Medicare Policy, July 2011, p. i, available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/8208.pdf.
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The second study examined the effects on all beneficiaries’ costs of
modifying Medicare’s cost sharing requirements with and without
changes to Medigap coverage. Specifically, it modeled (i) the impact
of a $550 combined deductible for Parts A and B, 20 percent coinsurance for all Medicare-covered services, and $5,500 limit on outof-pocket spending and (ii) the effects of these cost-sharing modifications plus prohibiting Medigap coverage for the first $550 (new
combined deductible) and limiting Medigap coverage to 50 percent
of cost-sharing for Medicare covered services above the deductible,
up to the new out-of-pocket limit.35
Modifying cost sharing without the Medigap coverage limits would
reduce spending liabilities for a small share of Medicare FFS beneficiaries, while increasing the costs for a larger share of beneficiaries.
As shown in Figure 4, over 70 percent of beneficiaries would experience an increase in out-of-pocket spending (average increase of $180
per person in 2013). Almost 24 percent would have nominal or no
change to their out-of-pocket spending. Five percent would have
lower out-of-pocket spending (average decrease of $1,570 per person).36 Changes in beneficiary out-of-pocket spending are a function
of beneficiaries’ service use and sources of supplemental coverage.
On the one hand, beneficiaries “who need expensive inpatient and
post-acute care or who use other high-cost outpatient services, and

FIGURE 4
Expected Change in FFS Medicare Beneficiaries’
Out-of-Pocket Spending under Cost-sharing Changes and
Cost-Sharing Changes Plus Medigap Coverage Limits, 2013
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Source: Juliette Cubanski et al., “Restructuring Medicare’s Benefit Design: Implications for Beneficiaries and Spending,” for the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation on Medicare Policy, November 2011, p. 14, available at www.kff.org/
medicare/upload/8256.pdf.
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who may be in relatively poor health—would be more likely to benefit from an alternative benefit design, because they are more likely to
incur expenditures that would exceed the new cost-sharing limit.”37
On the other hand, beneficiaries who use only Part B services (an
estimated 73 percent of beneficiaries in 2013), would experience an
increase in out-of-pocket spending, as would those with no utilization, who, although they have no cost-sharing, would face expected
higher supplemental premium costs.38
Under the restructured cost-sharing scenario plus Medigap limits,
the study estimates that a larger share (24 percent compared with 5
percent) of FFS Medicare beneficiaries (than under the cost-sharing
modifications alone) would see a reduction in out-of-pocket spending relative to current policy. This is largely due to significant reductions in Medigap premiums that would be expected because “policies would cover a smaller share of Medicare covered claims and
beneficiaries would use fewer services when faced with higher costsharing requirements.”39 Fewer beneficiaries (50 percent compared
with 72 percent) would experience an increase in their out-of-pocket costs (than under the cost-sharing modifications alone) because
higher cost sharing would be offset by reductions in Medigap premiums. However, adding Medigap coverage restrictions would also
result in higher out-of-pocket spending (than under the cost-sharing
modifications alone) for those who use inpatient hospital or skilled
nursing facility care, because they would be responsible for more of
the coinsurance for these services, the cost of which would not be
completely offset by a decrease in Medigap premiums.40

CO N C LU SI O N
Evidence suggests that limiting how much of a service’s cost Medigap policies may cover and modifying Medicare’s cost-sharing
requirements, either separately or in combination, could yield Medicare savings. The spending effects on beneficiaries would vary by
health status and amount of service use, as well as by type of supplemental coverage. However, some have urged caution about pursuing policies that spur beneficiaries to reduce service use because
they may cause beneficiaries to forego services that are necessary
and valuable. Nevertheless, the quest for Medicare program savings,
as well as the desire to encourage prudent use of necessary health
care resources, is likely to continue to make first-dollar coverage
15
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restrictions and Medicare cost-sharing redesign viable policy options for achieving these ends.
There may also be other reasons to explore such policies, such as
simplifying Medicare’s long-standing cost-sharing rules that require different cost-sharing amounts depending on the provider
and setting, limiting beneficiaries’ out-of-pocket costs, reducing the
need to purchase supplemental insurance, or encouraging beneficiaries to engage in value-based purchasing (where the value of the
service is incorporated into Medicare’s cost-sharing requirements).
In preparation for making recommendations in its June 2012 report
to Congress, MedPAC is currently reviewing ways that Medicare’s
benefit design could be reformed to reduce exposure to high out-ofpocket costs that result from Medicare’s lack of an out-of-pocket cap
on services under Parts A and B and to require some cost sharing
as a way to discourage use of low-value services.41 Their work and
the work summarized in this report should prove useful to policymakers seeking to understand the effects on different groups of
beneficiaries and strike the balance between program savings and
beneficiary spending on Medicare services and supplemental insurance premiums.
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